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From Hapless Victims of Desire 
to Responsibly Choosing Citizens
The Emancipation of Consumers in Low Countries’ Consumer 
Credit Regulation
joost jonker, michael milo and johan vannerom1
Legal history can help to date shifts in social attitudes, because it shows how, 
when, and often also why norms changed. We demonstrate this by examining 
when consumer credit became widely accepted in the Netherlands and Belgium, 
because general access to credit may serve as a good indicator of the advent of a 
consumer society. That shift in attitudes happened in both countries during the 
1960s, when legislators came to accept that credit is part and parcel of modern 
life for everybody. The consequent equality of consumers before the law then 
became more and more fragmented in European regulation, sacrificed to its 
leading principle, the idea that well-informed consumers choose rationally and are 
therefore responsibly for their choices.
Van ongelukkige slachtoffers van verlangen naar de verantwoordelijke keuze van de 
burgers. De emancipatie van Nederlandse en Vlaamse consumenten in de wetgeving inzake 
consumentenkrediet 
Rechtsgeschiedenis kan helpen om verschuivingen in maatschappelijke 
opvattingen te dateren, omdat daaruit blijkt hoe, wanneer en vaak ook waarom 
normering veranderde. We demonstreren dit door te onderzoeken wanneer 
consumentenkrediet in Nederland en België gemeengoed werd, omdat de 
algemene bereikbaarheid daarvan goed kan gelden als het begin van de 
consumptiemaatschappij. Die kentering deed zich in beide landen tijdens de 
jaren 1960 voor, toen de wetgever vaststelde dat krediet bij ieders moderne 
levenspatroon hoorde. Die gelijkheid van consumenten voor de wet raakte
the rise of consumer society
1 The authors are much obliged to Nick Huls for 
his welcome comments on earlier versions of 
this paper. We have gratefully used material 
collected in 2011 by Arne Mombers, Clara 
olde Heuvel, and Hanneke Palm, then still law 
students at Utrecht University. Seminars at 
Paris Nanterre University, the iish Amsterdam 
and Frankfurt generated much appreciated 
comments.
2 K. Schuyt and E. Taverne, 1950, welvaart in zwart-
wit, de Nederlandse wederopbouw in 12 beelden (The 
Hague 2000) 276.
3 D.S. Dotinga, Consumptief krediet in Nederland 
(Deventer 1983).
vervolgens in Europese regelgeving steeds meer versplinterd door de consequenties 
van het informatieparadigma, de idee dat goed geïnformeerde consumenten 
rationeel kiezen en dus voor de gevolgen van hun keuzes verantwoordelijk zijn.
Introduction
Changes in social attitudes are often very hard to pinpoint in time. We know 
the before and the after well enough to label the before as different from the 
after, but we can rarely identify a precise moment in which before became 
after. Take the consumer society. At what moment in time had attitudes 
towards modern consumption patterns changed sufficiently for us to identify 
their general acceptance? Legal history can help here. Regulations, the law, 
and jurisprudence mirror society and thus change with it. That means we 
can track shifts in how societies see particular issues by examining proposed 
legislation, case law and jurisprudence, and particularly lawyers’ debates 
about those issues. Of course one cannot always pin down whether shifting 
legal opinions lead society or the other way around, but at least those shifts 
enable us to date changing attitudes a little better.
Consumer credit regulation offers a good case in point. Historians have 
interpreted the rise of consumer credit use during the 1960s as marking the 
advent of a consumer society in the Netherlands, for instance, without really 
probing the timing or significance of this phenomenon.2 Economists examined 
the evolution of consumer credit, but omitted to ask what made attitudes 
change.3 By contrast, tackling the subject from a legal history perspective 
enables us to do just that, because it was a tightly regulated issue. Moreover, 
from that perspective we can trace changing attitudes better than, say, data 
about purchasing power or sales of consumer durables can do, because, unlike 
such figures, debates about regulation yield arguments about what ought to be 
permitted or not, and why. Doing that requires harnessing what legal historians 
do, i.e. interpreting the evolution of the law from the perspective of history, to 
the concerns of the social and economic historian, that is to say, tracing how and 
why attitudes in society change, with the risk of pleasing neither discipline.
We decided to take the risk and undertake to compare Belgium with 
the Netherlands in the expectation that, starting from a similar legal basis and 
ending up under the same regulatory eu umbrella, attitudes to credit would 
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closely resemble each other and follow similar trajectories of change. We find 
three marked developments. First, seen from a legal perspective consumer 
credit users emancipated. Until the Second World War they counted as 
potential victims of desire, ineptitude, and ignorance. However, new legislation 
introduced during the 1960s treated all citizens as alike and perfectly capable of 
judging for themselves if credit would be bad for them. Henceforth credit was 
seen as part and parcel of modern consumption patterns, which we take as the 
full acceptance of the consumer society in all its ramifications.
Second, the increasing complexity of modern financial products 
gradually eroded the equality of all citizens before the law, as one exception 
after another had to be made from the underlying general assumption that 
all consumers could judge for themselves. Third, despite the common legal 
point of departure and the shared European regulation, attitudes towards 
consumer protection continue to show subtle differences between the two 
countries. Belgian legislators nursed a distinct suspicion against the free 
market as a source of mischief and they continue to do so, resulting in a range 
of protective measures for consumers. By contrast, their Dutch counterparts 
have always shown a greater trust in the market and individual responsibility 
as safeguards against mishaps, which minimized intervention.
We proceed chronologically and reach back to the early nineteenth 
century to show how the two countries, despite a common legal point of 
departure and shared social prejudices about the dangers of consumer credit, 
diverged from each other when it came to protection. During the 1960s and 
1970s attitudes changed in both countries, effectively rendering consumers 
equal before the law. European regulation adopted that same principle, 
but added an important new one: the Information Paradigm, the idea that 
consumers choose responsibly if properly informed. Even so the consumers’ 
equality before the law did not last since one exception after another had to be 
made. Moreover, as it became clear that consumers couldn’t be expected to digest 
all kinds of information, the paradigm adopted turned effectively into a paradox.
Points of departure: freedom of contracting versus consumer protection
Initially consumers were not seen to need protection, with regard to credit 
or anything else. The Low Countries inherited equality before the law as 
constitutional principle from the Enlightenment and translated this during 
codification into a formal rule of contractual freedom.4 People are free in their 
4 Enshrined in the 1804 Code Civil for the southern 
Netherlands, and the 1809 civil code in the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. Following the 
incorporation of the northern Netherlands into 
the French Empire in 1811 the Code Civil came 
into force until the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
obtained its own Burgerlijk Wetboek (Civil Code) 
in 1838, meanwhile been replaced by a new Civil 
Code. Its section about money and credit, relevant 
for our argument here, became law in 1992. About 
the rise of consumer society
the early codification in the Netherlands see: 
J.H.A. Lokin, J.M. Milo and C.H. van Rhee, ed., 
Tweehonderd Jaren Codificatie (Groningen 2010). 
For Belgium: D. Heirbaut and G. Martyn, ed., 
Napoleons nalatenschap, tweehonderd jaar Burgerlijk 
Wetboek in België (Mechelen,2005).
5 A.S. Hartkamp & C.H. Sieburgh, Mr. C. Assers 
handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht 6: Verbintenissenrecht. Deel iii. 
Algemeen overeenkomstenrecht, (Deventer 2014); 
O.O. Cherednychenko, Fundamental Rights, 
Contract Law and the Protection of the Weaker Party. 
A Comparative Analysis of the Constitutionalisation 
of Contract Law, with Emphasis on Risky Financial 
Transactions (Munich 2007) 10-11; L. Cornelis, 
Algemene theorie van de verbintenis (Antwerp 2000) 
19; M. De Potter De Ten Broeck, ‘De gekwalificeerde 
benadeling aanvaard, maar wat met de grondslag?’ 
(footnote under Cass. 9 November 2012), Tijdschrift 
voor Belgisch Burgerlijk Recht 26 (2013) 131-140, 
ibidem 135; S. Stijns, Verbintenissenrecht. Boek 1: de 
bronnen van verbintenissen (Brugge 2005) 37-38; W. 
Van Gerven and S. Covemaeker, Verbintenissenrecht 
(Louvain 2001) 47-49; A. Van Oevelen, Algemeen 
verbintenissenrecht (Antwerp 2010) 72.
6 K.-O. Knops, ‘Verbraucherschutz und 
Kreditrecht’, Verbraucher und Recht 12 (1998) 
107-117, ibidem 109; Stijns, Verbintenissenrecht 37; 
A. Van Oevelen, Algemeen verbintenissenrecht 
(Antwerp 2010) 70-71.
7 Cf. Burgerlijk Wetboek 1809, articles 1021. 
1636, and 1648 ff.; C. Sieburgh, ‘Western Law 
of Contract’, in: M. Bussani and F. Werro, 
ed., European Private Law: a Handbook (Bern 
2009) 172; E. Terryn, Bedenktijden in het 
consumentenrecht. Het herroepingsrecht als 
instrument van consumentenbescherming 
(Antwerp 2008) 44.
8 The Act of 16 Pluviose, An xii (6 February 1804), 
applicable in the Netherlands since 1810. For a 
history of pawnbroking see H.A.J. Maassen, Tussen 
commercieel en sociaal krediet, de ontwikkeling van 
de Bank van Lening in Nederland van Lombard tot 
Gemeentelijke Kredietbank 1240-1940 (Hilversum 
1994). Unfortunately P.E.L.J. Soetaert, De Bergen 
van Barmhartigheid in de Spaanse, de Oostenrijkse 
en de Franse Nederlanden (1618-1795) (Brussels 
Gemeentekrediet, 1986) does not discuss the 
post-1795 period.
9 C. olde Heuvel, ‘Strafrechtelijke handhaving van 
pandbelening, Nederlandsch Juristenblad 88 (2013) 
795.
10 The Dutch gazette Staatsblad 31 October 1826, 
no. 132.
transactions, in choosing a counterparty, and in setting conditions.5 The French 
Code civil framers considered this formal contracting freedom as fundamental 
for both individual and general welfare: freedom of contract would boost the 
economy, because every deal enriched contracting parties.6 Credit transactions 
formed no exception.7 If parties agreed an excessive interest rate, that was up 
to them, so borrowers had to fulfill loan contracts until expiry.
Even so the law made an exception for pawnbroking and did this already 
under the French occupation (1795-1813), that is, long before the ‘social issue’ 
debate during the second half of the nineteenth century pilloried widespread 
malpractice. As the root of evils like usury and social depravation, pawnshops 
were subjected to a licensing system which amounted to a formal ban.8 However, 
the system foundered on the government’s dithering. It clung to the ban while 
omitting to provide the necessary alternatives to pawnshops. Consequently 
they simply remained in business, with license or without.9 In 1826 the Dutch 
government attempted to solve this problem by instructing the municipal 
loan banks to curb usury.10 This failed to work as well, because the pawnshops 
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11 Maassen, Tussen commercieel en sociaal krediet, 193.
12 Dutch Staatsblad 1910, 321.
13 Government memo (Memorie van Toelichting 
or MvT) accompanying the draft Pawnshop 
Act, Handelingen Tweede Kamer (hereafter 
htk) 1908-1909, item no. 277-3, p. 6. About the 
attempts to outlaw usury in Belgium C. Del 
Marmol, La répression de l’usure (Courtrai 1943). 
Other forms of consumer exploitation discussed 
by C. Biquet-Mathieu, Le sort des intérêts dans 
le droit du crédit. Actualité ou désuétude du Code 
civil? (Liège 1998).
14 Government reply to questions (Memorie van 
Antwoord or MvA), htk 1909-1910, item no. 53-2.
15 N. Huls, Consumentenkrediet. Sociaal-juridische 
beschouwingen, in het bijzonder met betrekking 
tot huurkoop van roerend goed (Deventer 1981); 
R. Cooter, ‘The confluence of justice and 
efficiency in the economic analysis of law’, in: F. 
Parisi and C.K. Roweley (eds.), The Origins of Law 
and Economics. Essays by the Founding Fathers 
(Cheltenham 2005) 229; C. Canaris, ‘Wandlungen 
des Schuldvertragsrechts, Tendenzen zu seiner 
“Materialisierung” ’, Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 
185 (2000) 273-363, ibidem 277; Cornelis, Algemene 
theorie, 21-24; H. Jacquemin, ‘Le formalisme 
de protection de la partie faible au rapport 
contractuel’, Annales de droit de Louvain 70 (2010) 
3-42, ibidem 14; E. Swaenepoel, Toetsing van het 
contractueel evenwicht (Antwerp 2011) 27-29; Van 
Oevelen, Algemeen verbintenissenrecht, 78-79.
16 The Belgian gazette Staatsblad, 7 May 1865.
typically supplied small loans of a few guilders, which the loan banks could 
not or would not handle for reasons of cost and space.11 Repeated attempts 
to bridle pawnbroking with new legislation foundered in Parliament until it 
finally passed the Pawnshop Act of 1910.12 This Act acknowledged usury and the 
rising number of pawnshops as social evils, however without accepting them 
as sufficient reasons for making an exception on the principle of contractual 
freedom.13 In reply to parliamentary questions the government professed itself 
unwilling to confront a deeprooted and accepted phenomenon like pawn credit 
and put its hope for eliminating it on education to teach people how to achieve 
economic self-sufficiency.14 Therefore the Act did not do much more than an 
overhaul of the license system for pawnshops plus new regulations for their 
keeping of records; their customers did not get any form of protection.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century a different form of 
ambivalence, one determined by class prejudices, surfaced in reactions to 
new forms of consumer credit. When purchasing household furniture or 
clothing upper strata of society received credit a matter of course, others mostly 
bought on tick for victuals like bread and milk or at cafés, with social control 
mechanisms ensuring reasonable conditions and regular repayment all around. 
However, hire-purchase and installment schemes brought durable consumer 
goods within reach of people on low incomes, raising fears that they would use 
these facilities to live beyond their means and social status. These new credit 
forms also remained impervious to the usual mechanisms of social control, 
while getting a dubious reputation because the seller-creditor’s power over 
buyer-borrowers was seen as conducive to one-sided conditions and usury.15
Belgian legislators tackled these credit forms from the perspective of 
usury, defined in the 1865 Act concerning money lending as a misdemeanour, 
both for professional lending and for consumer credit.16 As the law put it, 
the rise of consumer society
17 Burgerlijk Wetboek, article 1097ter.
18 D. Caplovitz, The Poor Pay More, Consumer 
Practices of Low-Income Families (New York 1967).
19 Belgian Supreme Court, cassation 29 January 
1990, Pasicrisie belge 1990, i, 626; idem, cassation 
28 November 1985, Pasicrisie belge 1986, i, 391; 
idem, cassation 7 September 1978, Pasicrisie 
belge 1979, i, 17; Biquet-Mathieu, Le sort des 
intérêts, 123-124; C. Van Hulle with contributions 
by M. Dutordoir, K. Smedts, K. De Cock, H. 
Drijkoningen, T. Lievens and A. Vanderlinden, 
Bank- en financiewezen, i (Louvain 2010) 26-28; 
M.E. Storme, ‘Vragen rond rente’, Tijdschrift van 
de Vrederechters (1997) 196-203, ibidem 203.
20 Burgerlijk Wetboek article 1154.
21 Huls, Consumentenkrediet 15-16; C.J.H. Jansen, 
‘De Geldschieterswet van 28 januari 1932’, 
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 
26 (2015) 4-5. Cf. B. van Dam, nvvk, 75 jaar 
toonaangevend en springlevend (The Hague 2008) 
for an overview.
22 See notably C. Del Marmol, ‘La clause de 
réserve de propriété dans les ventes de meubles 
et la protection du vendeur’, Annales de droit 
commercial et industriel, français, étranger et 
international 48 (1939) 177-219; more recently, M.E. 
Storme, ‘Eigendomsvoorbehoud en samenloop 
buiten faillissement. Hof van Cassatie leidt aan 
fantoompijn’, Rechtskundig Weekblad 80 (2011-
2012) 254-266.
lenders committed usury when they misused a borrower’s needs, weaknesses, 
passions, or ignorance to obtain, on behalf of themselves or others, an interest 
rate exceeding the normal rate and the cover for the loan’s risk.17 Therefore this 
concept of usury consisted of two elements, a subjective and an objective one. 
On the one hand the creditor must knowingly misuse a borrower’s weaknesses, 
for instance by exploiting a penurious situation to negotiate a higher interest 
rate. On the other hand the interest charged may not exceed the going market 
rate plus, depending on the case, a surcharge covering a borrower’s insolvency 
risk. A poorer borrower thus needs to pay more interest than financially sound 
ones, because the lender runs a higher risk of non-payment.18 One potential 
source of usury, compound interest or ‘anatocism’, was given particular 
attention. When in arrears borrowers had to pay not just interest over unpaid 
installments, but also over unpaid interests due, which could lead to a rapidly 
spiralling debt.19 For that reason Belgium bound compound interest to tight 
regulation. Only interest due over actual sums borrowed could be subject to 
new interest charges, and then under very strict conditions, that is to say in 
fulfilment of a court order or a special transaction, if and when that order or 
transaction concern interests due for a minimum of one whole year.20
Though curbing the usury associated with the new forms of consumer 
credit formed an equally powerful public concern in the Netherlands, the 
government failed to design effective legislation covering them, for two 
reasons.21 First, for technical legal reasons hire-purchase and installment 
credit fitted badly in the commercial law system and lawyers debating the 
issue showed themselves better at raising objections than at finding practical 
solutions. Second, lawyers clung to the hallowed principle of contracting 
freedom and would not consider making an exception for usury, let alone 
consumer credit.22 The lengthy debates highlight the deep social prejudices 
underlying them: in the Netherlands, as no doubt in Belgium, too, the 
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23 Discussed at length by the leader of the Catholic 
party rksp, the lawyer L.G. Kortenhorst, htk, 
1928-1929, 612 and following, as well as by Frida 
Katz of the chu fraction, referring to a Danish Act 
of 8 May 1917: idem, 665.
24 See htk, 1891-1892, sessions of 24 November, 
4 and 9 December 1891. De Kanter mp utters 
serious criticism, which the minister counters 
with the simple iura vigilantibus scripta – the law 
protects the watchful (p. 351). This Roman law 
principle can be found in an opinion from the 
second century ad and formulated by the lawyer 
Scaevola. Almost four centuries later it found its 
way into the Emperor Justinianus’s legal texts: 
Digests 42.8.24. See J.E. Spruit, R. Feenstra and 
F.B.J. Wubbe, Corpus Iuris Civilis. Tekst en vertaling 
v (The Hague 2000). The two dissertations were 
M.A.H.L. van Lier, Afbetalingscontracten (Utrecht 
1892) and H.L. Hemsing, Het afbetalingscontract 
(Dordrecht 1892).
25 Van Lier, Afbetalingscontracten, 70.
26 Supreme Court 7 February 1902, Weekblad van het 
Recht 7720.
27 The keynotes were given by Paul Scholten and 
A.A.H. Struycken (Handelingen njv 1906 i, 84-198).
28 Handelingen njv 1906 ii, 17 ff. J.A. Levy pleaded 
passionately for a ban. However, he was ‘second 
to none in voicing displeasure’, J.H.A. Lokin 
and C.J.H. Jansen, Tussen droom en daad, de 
Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging 1870-1995 (Zwolle 
1995) 90 and could not convince the 80-5 
majority; idem, 80.
constitutional principle of equality before the law mirrored a society in which 
class distinctions were taken for granted, as was class-bound behaviour. 
Hire-purchase and installment credit were considered dangerous as means 
to seduce people on low incomes to live above their status on credit. Instead, 
people should first learn how to manage money properly, and learn to save 
before taking credit.23 Lawyers did criticize unfair clauses in hire-purchase 
and installment contracts. The lawyer and liberal mp P.H. de Kanter pilloried 
them in parliament as early as 1891, while the following year two academic 
dissertations about installment purchases were published.24 One of them 
advocated binding legislation and notably a ban on sellers formally keeping 
ownership of goods sold, because, as the author put it, the state ought to 
protect its citizens, especially the propertyless, against self-inflicted damages 
incurred through inexperience or weakness.25 However, in 1902 the Supreme 
Court rejected that view.26
Four years later the Dutch Law Society (Nederlandsche Juristen Vereeniging 
or njv) discussed the need for legislation covering installment plans. Both 
keynote lectures noted the near absence in the Netherlands, unlike Germany, 
Austria, Britain, and the us, of jurisprudence, data on the prevalence of 
consumer credit, and of academic debate.27 In the debate following the 
lectures some of the society’s members pleaded emphatically for a total 
ban, but an overwhelming majority held fast to the principle of contractual 
freedom and the individual citizen’s obligation to be on their guard in any 
transactions.28 The njv felt no immediate need for legislation, let alone a ban. 
A small majority considered a change in the law desirable, but only as part of 
a more general commercial law overhaul designed to give consumers various 
guarantees: fairer clauses covering shortfalls, clear rules for extensions, 
the rise of consumer society

The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw a rapid spread of 
new consumer credit forms like buying on installments: an adverti-
sement in the newspaper Haagsche Courant, 5 May 1884, offering 
‘all kinds of goods’ on installment.
National Library of the Netherlands, The Hague.
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29 Handelingen njv 1906 i, 136-137. Keynote deliverer 
Struycken refused to go that far. He considered 
Dutch law, in contrast to German and Austrian 
law, as hardly social in intent, but felt that 
there had to be very strong arguments for 
changing such a key principle as the autonomy 
of contracting parties. However, Struycken did 
concede to having no idea about the importance 
of installment credit and associated malpractices, 
and therefore no proper answer to the Dutch law 
society’s questions: Handelingen njv 1906 i, 196-
197. Van Lier had prepared the ground by defining 
the conditions for reservation of ownership: Van 
Lier, Afbetalingscontracten, 19.
30 Supreme Court, 26 March 1931, Nederlandsche 
Jurisprudentie (hereafter nj) 1931, 669.
31 htk, 1928-1929, item no. 395.
32 Cf. Jansen, ‘Geldschieterswet’; Huls, 
Consumentenkrediet 57-58; W. Schoonderbeek, De 
geldschieterswet (Arnhem 1957).
33 Committee Report ‘Verslag van de Commissie 
inzake de wettelijke regeling van de 
afbetalingsovereenkomst’ (The Hague 1932).
34 Cf. the bw (Civil Code) articles 7a:1576 and 1576 
a-g about installment plans and art.7:a:1576h-x 
about hire-purchase. An installment plan is a sale 
and purchase contract in which parties agree 
that the sale price will be paid in installments, 
two or more of which are due after the buyer has 
received the product in question. Hire-purchase is 
a variation on the above involving the reservation 
of ownership.
and a statutory duty to repay installments not due.29 That overhaul never 
happened, but a court ruling in 1931 fulfilled some of these desiderata by 
stating that a hire-purchaser in arrears had to return the property concerned, 
in order to be freed from paying the remaining installments.30
Meanwhile five mps had tabled draft legislation to combat usury.31 
Referring to recent reports about malpractices in the so-called people’s 
credit business, these initiators wanted binding contractual rules and state 
supervision of the institutions concerned. Their proposal led to Parliament 
passing the 1932 Credit Providers Act (Geldschieterswet), which at last curtailed 
the hallowed freedom of contracting. Pawn creditors were put under 
government supervision through a licensing system and the imposition 
of mandatory transparent conditions with maximum rates. A standing 
commission made sure the rules were applied.32 That same year another 
government commission reported on legislating installment plans. The 
report avoided moralizing, denied the existence of malpractices and claimed 
that installment purchases and hire-purchase boosted retail sales. However, 
the commission did identify some points of friction, including a declining 
willingness to meet payment deadlines and expensive legal procedures, and 
its proposed remedies made a half-hearted step towards consumer protection. 
Hire-purchase and installment plans, though market-determined, did require 
legislation in order to protect consumers against their own ineptitude. 
That would have to be achieved by imposing statutory duties to provide 
information on buyers and sellers, by state supervision on door-to-door 
selling, and by certain statutory contract clauses.33 These proposals were on 
the one hand realized in article 1576 bw (Civic Code), and on the other in the 
Installment Providers Act which imposed a license system to tackle usury 
and door-to-door selling.34 Contrary to the 1932 Geldschieterswet, this license 
the rise of consumer society
35 Already in 1942 an article Nederlandsch Juristen 
Blad signalled the lack of supervision: Huls, 
Consumentenkrediet 69.
36 The Act of 28 October 1946, which ratified a 
decree issued jointly by the secretaries-general 
heading the ministries of the Interior and Justice 
in 1942. Prior to the parliamentary debate 
pawnshops are characterized as ‘the least 
desirable institutions responding to the credit 
needs of the poorer population’, Annex Tweede 
Kamer 1946, no. 25. The empty shell was only 
filled by the Pawn Lending Act 2014. See for a 
penal law perspective on this issue Olde Heuvel, 
‘Strafrechtelijke handhaving’, and for a private law 
perspective A. Salomons, ‘Goederenrechtelijke 
aspecten van pandbelening’, Weekblad voor 
Privaatrecht, Notarisambt en Registratie 6986 
(2013) 653-655.
37 htk 1945-1946, item no. 182-3. Between 1948 
and 1961 the Act against price pushing and 
goods hoarding (Dutch Staatsblad 1939, 634) 
imposed maximum rates on installment 
plans, in effect handicapping proper pricing: 
Huls, Consumentenkrediet 73. The postwar 
developments analyzed by Van Dam, nvvk 35-66.
38 Schoonderbeek, Geldschieterswet 305-306.
system never worked since the government failed to enact the supervision of 
installment providers.35
Thus from a similar legal point of departure the two countries reacted 
very differently to hire-purchase and installment plans. Whereas Belgium 
sacrificed contracting freedom to consumer protection early, it took the 
Netherlands some seventy years before doing the same.
Curtailing creditors
After the Second World War both countries showed a curious phenomenon. 
Rising incomes boosted the use of consumer credit, but social prejudices 
against it remained virtually unchanged. Immediately after the war the 
Dutch government, fearing that post-war scarcities would combine with 
strong pent-up demand to create serious bottlenecks, introduced consumer 
credit restrictions. In 1946 all pawnshop licenses were cancelled and the 
issuing of new ones halted, rendering the Pandhuiswet an empty shell, 
because existing pawnshops were allowed to remain in business.36 That 
same year the government also created a scheme for people wanting to buy 
‘indispensable consumer durables’. The scheme entailed a system of tightly 
regulated,  non-profit loans in the form of vouchers with which people could 
buy goods like shoes, clothes and certain household goods at designated 
shops. The system’s provisions for rescheduling payments in case of arrears 
were remarkably lenient.37
Intended as provisional, these measures triggered a debate about 
overhauling the existing legislation concerning pawnshops and installment 
plans. Some authors noted that consumer credit rose without a rise in 
abuse.38 At the same time an official report on installment plans clung to 
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39 This was the Lichtenauer committee in its Rapport 
omtrent het afbetalingswezen (The Hague 1954); 
Huls, Consumentenkrediet, 77.
40 Dutch Staatsblad 1961, no. 218. The Burgerlijk 
Wetboek’s section concerning installment credit 
was left unchanged, but the new law introduced a 
different, broader definition of installment plans 
which was also made to cover hire-purchase. 
The law targeted only commercially operating 
installment financiers.
41 Art. 40. Huls, Consumentenkrediet, 81.
42 E.H. Hondius,‘Non-Legislative Means of 
Consumer Protection, The Dutch Perspective’, 
Journal of Consumer Policy 7 (1984) 137-156.
43 Transactions of the Belgian Senate 1954-1955, no. 
211. Addressing the Chamber of Representatives, 
the Minister for Economic Affairs Jean Rey 
underlined that installment plans were widely 
used by the working class, which needs 
protection against certain excesses, Transactions 
of the Chamber of Representatives 1956-1957, 20 
June 1957, no. 716.
received opinion about trusting the market while reiterating the pre-war 
prejudices. The supply of credit to people with little means ought to be left 
to the free market, hemmed in only by regulations to curb excesses and 
protect economically weak social groups against their inexperience and 
thoughtlessness.39 The debate resulted in the 1961 Installment Plans Act 
(Wet op het afbetalingsstelsel), which retained the licensing system while 
giving a better definition of installment plans and imposing a statutory 
duty on sellers to check the creditworthiness of purchasers.40 Three years 
later the high street banks set up the Bureau for Credit Registration (Bureau 
Krediet Registratie or bkr) as a central repository of transactions enabling the 
mandatory checks. Affiliated lenders agreed to obtain prior information 
on all borrowers of sums between 250 and 100,000 guilders, to register all 
transactions, and in all respects to act ‘in a way as behoves good sellers on 
installment and lenders on installment’.41 This form of self-regulation is a 
form of ‘soft law’ that counts as an effective means of regulating producer-
consumer relations.42
Belgian legislators showed similar attitudes. In 1955 a government 
reply to parliamentary comments on a draft installment purchases law 
acknowledged the increasing popularity of this credit type, but underlined at 
the same time that it enabled ‘people on low incomes to buy goods which they 
could not buy cash without saving first’. That was exactly where, according 
to the government, a social danger lurked. The combination of long payment 
terms, low payments, and the immediate enjoyment of the coveted product 
could easily lead buyers to overestimate their ability to pay and, worse, to turn 
a blind eye to the hidden high interest rates. The power of modern advertising 
increased that danger still further, by fuelling desire ‘ambiguously and indeed 
fraudulently’. The reply added particular economic objections to an unbridled 
expansion of installment purchasing, such as exaggerating business 
fluctuations, stimulating consumption over investment, and inflation.43 The 
proposed law central, public register for installment plans remained a good 
intention for the moment.
the rise of consumer society

Since 1964 the Bureau Krediet Registratie (bkr) records all consumer crediet in 
the Netherlands. Photo: www.bkr.nl.
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44 Unfortunately the Commission’s publicly 
available records stop in the 1930s. The 
commission’s long-term chairman and one of 
the initiators of the 1932 law, G. van den Bergh, 
left his papers to the International Institute 
for Social History, Amsterdam. Boxes 8 and 9 
cover his activity as chairman, but only up to 
1962.
45 Transactions Second Chamber 1968-1969, item 
no. 9952.
46 Huls, Consumentenkrediet, 85. Transactions 
Second Chamber 1969-1970, item no. 9952-5 
Provisional Report, p. 1. Second Chamber Papers 
1968-1969, no. 9952-3 Government Motivation, 
11. Transactions Second Chamber 1968-1969, 
item no. 9952-3 Government Motivation, 21. 
One of the new practices was targeted by the 
law concerning door-to-door selling, published 
in the Dutch Staatsblad 1973, 438. That law 
amended the law concerning installment plans 
and also introduced a novelty in Dutch law, a fixed 
reflection term. Buyers can cancel the transaction 
within eight days and without having to give 
a reason for doing so. Thereby the reflection 
term protects buyers against acting in haste: 
Government Motivation, Second Chamber 1970-
1971, item no. 11106-3; Government Motivation. 
Second Chamber 1968-1969, item no. 9952-3, 11.
47 Dutch Staatsblad 1972, no. 399.
Towards the end of the 1960s opinions in the Low Countries changed, 
however. Prodded by the commission supervising the 1932 Geldschieterswet’s 
license system, the Dutch government submitted a proposal to replace that 
Act.44 The proposal’s title, Consumer Credit Act, eloquently summed up the 
changed conceptions which the government’s accompanying motivation 
spelt out.45 Consumer credit was no longer regarded as a dubious excess to be 
bridled through the firm supervision of creditors, but presented as a normal 
aspect of modern society in need of guidelines. In a remarkable conceptual 
turnaround, the government even labelled consumer credit saving in 
hindsight. No wonder that the proposal targeted a group much bigger than 
the socially weak and the usurers parasiting on them. The draft law was 
meant for all ordinary citizens and included regulations for all new kinds 
of credit offered by the high street banks.46 Promulgated in 1972, the act 
retained the regulatory principles which the 1932 Geldschieterswet had shown 
to work, i.e. the prevention of creditor malpractices through a licensing 
system, transparent conditions with maximum rates, and government 
supervision.47
Thus the 1972 Consumer Credit Act (Wet op het consumptief geldkrediet) 
marked a clear break with the past in four respects. First, the old social 
prejudices had disappeared. Consumer credit was no longer seen as a threat 
to particular social classes, but accepted as a normal part of modern living for 
everybody, a facility enabling citizens to consume. Second, this conceptual 
switch translated into the government dropping the close focus on protecting 
the weak, in effect recognizing the equality of all consumers before the law. In 
other words, the Act accepted all citizens as classless consumers differentiated 
primarily by income level and spending patterns. Third, the normative idea 
that people should first learn to save had disappeared. Fourth, the principle 
the rise of consumer society
48 Historical introductions to consumer law 
traditionally use a speech by us President John 
F. Kennedy from 1962 to pinpoint the origins 
of consumentism: ‘Consumers by definition 
includes us all.’ See for instance the contribution 
by Gerhard Rijken, ‘Ontstaan en positie van het 
consumentenrecht’, in: E.H. Hondius and G. 
Rijken, Handboek Consumentenrecht (Zutphen 
2015) 19-30.
49 cbs Statline http://statline.cbs.nl/
Statweb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=3
7758&D1=109-118&D2=22,27,32,37,42,63-
74&HDR=T&STB=G1&VW=T. (4 August 2016). 
A good summary of the factors driving the rising 
demand for credit in N. Huls, Vergeef ons vaker 
onze schulden, naar een schone lei 2.0 (The Hague 
2016) 27-29.
50 A. Pais, Consumer credit in The Netherlands 
(Rotterdam 1975), 155 and idem, ‘Op de pof’, 
De Economist 117 (1969) 1-23, ibidem 2, 6-7 
doi:10.1007/BF01726047.
51 Transactions Belgian Senate 1963-1964, 
nos. 217 and 342; Transactions Chamber of 
Representatives, no. 921-2.
52 Transactions Chamber of Representatives 1976-
1977, no. 1102-1.
53 Transactions Belgian Senate 1987-1988, no. 638-1. 
The Act’s contents discussed amply by J. Van Den 
Bergh, Koop (afbetalingsovereenkomsten) (Brussels 
1960); A. De Caluwe, Les ventes, les prêts et les prêts 
personnels à tempérament, les obligations de brasserie 
(Brussels 1965); J. Van Den Bergh and A. De Caluwe, 
Afbetalingsovereenkomsten, financieringshuur, 
brouwerijovereenkomsten (Ghent 1975).
of contractual freedom was sacrificed to the need for consumer protection.48 
This watershed coincided with changing behaviour. Between 1960 and 1970 
rising disposable income boosted the amount of consumer credit supplied 
from the equivalent of 65 million euro to 814 million.49 Even so two-thirds 
of respondents people interviewed for market research purposes during 
the second half of the 1960s expressed themselves against installment 
purchasing.50
Similar changes in attitude and behaviour occurred in Belgium. Early 
signs were visible by 1964, when government proposals to bring personal loans 
under the same regime as installment purchases avoided all qualifications 
about the likely target group, as did the subsequent parliamentary debate on 
the proposals.51 In 1977 the government submitted a consumer credit law to 
parliament which acknowledged the equality of all users by simply referring to 
consumers.52 Sent back to the drawing board by parliament, the government 
unveiled a new proposal in 1987, its motivation showing a full emancipation 
of consumer credit. The fast growth of amounts supplied and the absence of 
serious problems demonstrated that consumer credit’s negative connotations 
had disappeared; it had now become a key function of the consumer society 
which rendered goods accessible to a wide public. Borrowers fulfilled their 
obligations generally quite well, despite signs of rising excess debt cases. 
The law was designed to reduce their number, in part through mandatory 
registration of transactions at the central debt administration bureau which 
had finally been set up two years earlier, in 1985. That institute did not belong 
to the private sector, as in the Netherlands, but formed a department of the 
Nationale Bank van België, the central bank.53 The Belgian Consumer Credit Act 
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54 See J. Vannerom, Consumentenbescherming bij de 
uitvoering en herziening van kredietovereenkomsten 
(Antwerp 2015) 86-99.
55 Van Dyck adopts this definition for the 
protection of investors, see idem, De 
geharmoniseerde prospectusplicht. Kritische 
analyse van de geharmoniseerde prospectusplicht 
in de Prospectusrichtlijn 2003/71/eg en haar 
omzettingswetten in België, Nederland, Frankrijk, 
het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Duitsland, (Bruges 2010) 
44. The latest guidelines contain numerous 
mandatory information and/or advice duties 
for suppliers of goods or services: see for 
instance Guideline 2008/122/ec of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 14 January 2009 
about the protection of consumers facing 
certain aspects of transactions concerning the 
parttime use, holiday products of long duration, 
selling on and exchange, Gazette L 3 February 
2009, issue 33, 10-30; Guideline 2008/48/
ec; Guideline 87/102/eec; com (2011) 142 def. 
[Proposal for a Guideline of the European 
Parliament and the Council concerning home 
finance transactions]. Cf. also S. Grundmann 
and Y.M. Atamer, ‘European Contract Law 
and Banking Contracts after the Financial 
Crisis: Challenges for Contracting and Market 
Transactions’, in: S. Grundmann and Y.M. 
Atamer (eds.), Financial Services, Financial Crisis 
and General European Contract Law. Failure 
and Challenges of Contracting (Alphen a/d Rijn 
2011) 3-31, ibidem 16 and 20-21; E. Poillot, Droit 
européen de la consommation et uniformisation 
du droit des contrats (Paris 2006) 94; I. Ramsay, 
‘Regulation of consumer credit’, in: G. Howells, 
I. Ramsay, T. Wilhelmsson and D. Kraft (eds.), 
Handbook of research on international consumer 
law (Cheltenham 2010) 366-405, ibidem 385; 
N. Reich, ‘Economic law, consumer interests 
and eu integration’, in: H.-W. Micklitz, N. Reich 
and P. Rott (eds.), Understanding eu Consumer 
Law (Antwerp 2009)1-60, ibidem 21-22; R. 
Steennot, ‘Sanctionering van inbreuken op 
het consumentenrecht: de zoektocht naar 
een rechtvaardige oplossing’, in: F. Evers 
and P. Lefranc, ed., Kiezen tussen recht en 
rechtvaardigheid (Bruges 2009) 145-155, ibidem 
146; G. Straetmans, ‘Some thoughts on the future 
European consumer acquis’, European Business 
Law Review 20 (2009) 423-442, ibidem 428-429; 
T. Van Dyck and V. Colaert, ‘Reclameregulering 
als vorm van consumentenbescherming’, in: C. 
Bruyneel, J.P. Buyle, M. Delierneux, J.F. Romain 
and E. Van Den Haute (eds.), Liber Amicorum A. 
Bruyneel (Brussels 2008) 33-72, ibidem 35-36; T. 
Wilhelmsson, G. Howells and H.-W. Micklitz, 
‘European Consumer Law’, in: M. Bussani 
and F. Werro (eds.), European Private Law: a 
Handbook (Bern 2009) 245-291, ibidem 261. For 
an overview of the historical development of 
the information paradigm in finance law see Van 
Dyck, Geharmoniseerde prospectusplicht, 44-56.
(Wet van 12 juni 1991 op het consumentenkrediet) reached the statute book in 
1991.
European regulation: the Information Paradigm
Consumers’ equality before the law had hardly been achieved or it began 
to be restricted again by European regulation.54 In 1975 the European 
Council adopted the so-called Information Paradigm as the first general 
principle of consumer protection, the idea that consumers, if given correct 
and complete information, will take rational and proper decisions.55 
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56 J. Stuyck and G. Straetmans, Financiële diensten en 
de consument. Bankdiensten – Consumentenkrediet 
– Hypothecair krediet – Verzekeringen – 
Handelspraktijken volgens het Belgisch en Europees 
recht (Antwerp 1994) 31-32.
57 Consideration 3, Council Resolution dated 14 
April 1975 outlining a first eec programme for 
a policy concerning consumer protection and 
information, Gazette L 24 April 1975, 1; E. Poillot, 
Droit européen, 94. Council Resolution of 19 May 
1981 outlining a second eec programme for a 
policy concerning consumer protection and 
information, Gazette L 3 June 1981, 6.
58 Following article vii. 70 wer the creditor must 
also tell consumers about their right to cancel: 
Jacquemin, ‘Le formalisme’, 11-13.
59 Stuyck and Straetmans, Financiële diensten, 39.
60 Y.M. Atamer, ‘Duty of Responsible Lending: 
Should the European Union Take Action?’, in: 
Grundmann and Atamer, Financial Services, 179-
202, ibidem 199.
61 Considerations 35 and 36 CoJ 178/84, 
Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany 
(Reinheitsgebot); consideration 19 CoJ C-238/89, 
Pall Corp. v. P.J. Dahlhausen & Co.; cf. also 
consideration 24 CoJ C-470/93, Verein gegen 
Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Köln eV. v. Mars 
GmbH; CoJ C-315/92, Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb 
eV v. Clinique Laborataires snc en Estée Lauder 
Cosmetics GmbH; consideration 17 CoJ C-126/91, 
Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft 
eV. v. Yves Rocher GmbH; considerations 15-17 
inclusive CoJ C-373/90, Nissan. Wilhelmsson, 
Howells and Micklitz, ‘European Consumer Law’ 
270-271.
62 Cf. in this sense also O. Bar-Gill and E. Warren, 
‘Making Credit Safer’, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 157 (2008) 101-201, ibidem 109, 
distinguishing between ‘the rational uninformed 
consumer’ and ‘the imperfectly rational 
consumer’; C. Camerer, S. Issacharoff, G. 
Loewenstein, T. O’Donoghue and M. Rabin, 
‘Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral 
Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric 
Paternalism” ’, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 152 (2003) 1211-1254, ibidem 1215; 
R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (New 
York 2003) 17-18. Van Dyck, Geharmoniseerde 
prospectusplicht, 493.
63 R. Incardona and C. Poncibò, ‘The Average 
Consumer, the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive, and the Cognitive Revolution’, Journal of 
consumer policy 30 (2007) 21-38, ibidem 27.
Consumers must therefore inform themselves before buying, but they will 
only be free to choose if they possess sufficient and correct information.56 
Conversely, sellers have mandatory information duties.57 That information 
may concern either the legal position of the consumer, for instance their 
right to cancel within a fortnight, or practical data such as the price or the 
cost of goods or services.58 Sellers must show themselves active in providing 
all relevant information, because they are often in a better position to obtain 
it.59 Access to credit information bureaus enables lenders, for instance, to 
better estimate the possibilities for repayment than consumers can do.60 
The mandatory duty to inform can have considerable implications. It was 
ultimately raised to a fundamental consumer right.61 The information 
paradigm does have a flipside, however. Consumers can only choose 
judiciously if properly informed, but then they are also responsible their 
decisions.62 Careless or imprudent consumers must therefore expect firm 
treatment.63
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64 Considerations accompanying Guideline 87/102/
eec.
65 Second Chamber 1986-1987, item no. 19785-3, 68.
66 Consideration 27 Court of Justice (CoJ) C-220/98, 
Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH & Co. ohg v. 
Lancaster Group GmbH; consideration 36 CoJ 
C-303/97, Verbraucherschutzverein eV v. Sektkellerei 
G.C. Kessler GmbH und Co; consideration 31 CoJ 
C-210/96, Gut Springenheide GmbH en Rudolf Tusky 
v. Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt.
67 CoJ C-240/98 until C-244/98, Oceano Grupo 
Editorial sa v. Rocio Murciano Quintero. In 
Consideration 25, the Court points out that the 
system of consumer protection embodied in the 
guideline departs from the idea that consumers 
find themselves in a weak position vis-a-vis sellers 
and possess less information than they. See also: 
Consideration 46 CoJ C-137/08, vb Pénzügyi Lízing 
Zrt. v. Ferenc Schneider; consideration 29 CoJ 
C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones sl v. Cristina 
Rodríguez Nogueira; consideration 25 CoJ C-168/05, 
Elias Maria Mostaza Claro v. Centro Movil 
Milenium; J. Stuyck, ‘Consumentenbescherming 
in tijden van economische crisis’, Jura Falconis 45 
(2009-2010) 323-333, ibidem 328.
68 Consideration 46 CoJ C-137/08, vb Pénzügyi 
Lízing Zrt. v. Ferenc Schneider; consideration 29 
CoJ C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones sl 
v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira; consideration 
25 CoJ C-168/05, Elias Maria Mostaza Claro v. 
Centro Movil Milenium; J. Rinkes, ‘De consument 
als zwakke partij’, Ars Aequi 48 (2009) 380-387, 
ibidem 381-382; Swaenepoel, Toetsing, 24-25.
69 A. De Boeck, Informatierechten en -plichten 
bij de totstandkoming en uitvoering van 
overeenkomsten: grondslagen, draagwijdte en 
sancties (Antwerp 2000) 434-435; A. De Boeck, 
‘De informatieverplichting van de professioneel 
t.a.v. de consument’, in: Y. Merchiers, ed., 
Consumentenrecht (Bruges 1998) 40; Swaenepoel, 
Toetsing, 698-699. Consumers’ trust in their own 
banker remains high. Cf. for instance W. Sinn, D. 
Vater, D. Lubig and M. Kasch, Was Bankkunden 
wirklich wollen (Munich 2012) 11-12.
These principles were enshrined in the first European consumer 
credit directive, issued in 1987 to harmonize the varying levels of consumer 
protection in member states.64 To reduce the scope for legal shams, it dropped 
the customary terms of hire-purchase and installment credit and instead 
adopted a broad, functional definition of consumer credit derived from 
American conceptions and covering all forms in one go.65 The guideline 
formulated minimum requirements for consumer protection, including 
statutory license systems for creditors, a written contract, mandatory 
information duties, limits to repossession rights, and a right for borrowers to 
early repayment.
Interpreting the directive, the European Court of Justice formulated 
two general principles. First, following the principle of the law serving the 
watchful, the Court defined a kind of Mr. and Mrs. Normal: an averagely 
informed, prudent, and watchful consumer.66 Second, unlike people in 
business consumers deserve protection because they have a weaker position.67 
Sellers of products or services will often present consumers with non-
negotiable standard contracts.68 The character of relationships between 
sellers and buyers may also weaken the latter’s position, for instance if it leads 
them to believe that a business representative, say their bank’s client manager, 
will propose solutions which suits them, rather than the business, best.69 
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70 CoJ C-168/05, Elias Maria Mostaza Claro v. Centro 
Movil Milenium.
71 rl 2008/48, l 133/66, overweging 4.
72 CoJ C-33/97, Colim v. Bigg’s Continent Noord nv. 
Though this verdict concerned the freedom for 
goods, it appears applicable to services as well.
73 Consideration 19-20 CoJ C-154/89, Commissie v. 
France (Tourist guides); Stuyck and Straetmans, 
Financiële diensten, 29-30.
74 Considerations 15 and 17 CoJ C-85/94, Groupement 
des Producteurs, Importateurs et Agents Généraux 
d’Eaux Minérales Etrangères, vzw (Piageme) and 
others v. Peeters nv; L. Gormley, ‘The Consumer 
Acquis and the Internal Market’, European 
Business Law Review 20 (2009) 409-422, 
ibidem 413.
75 Consideration 18 Guideline 2005/29/eg; CoJ 
C-220/98, Estée Lauder Cosmetics; Incardona 
and Poncibò, ‘The average consumer’, 22-26; 
E. Terryn, Bedenktijden in het consumentenrecht. 
Het herroepingsrecht als instrument van 
consumentenbescherming (Antwerp 2008) 38; 
Swaenepoel, Toetsing, 57-58.
76 Terryn, Bedenktijden, 41. Cf. also P. Bülow, 
‘§ 497’, in: P. Bülow and M. Artz, ed., 
Verbraucherkreditrecht (Munich 2011) 480.
Information asymmetries between sellers and buyers also weaken the latter’s 
negotiating position, because the former always possess more information.70
Becoming ever more particular
The first European directive and the subsequent Court decisions treated all 
consumers alike and aimed to provide minimum protection levels in member 
states. Soon those levels began to diverge more and more. Free to impose 
additional requirements, member states discovered consumer protection 
as a practical cover for all kind of protectionist policies, damaging the free 
circulation of goods and services, for instance the scope for crossborder credit 
flows.71 Moreover, national courts retained the authority to apply the directive’s 
guidelines to local circumstances, thereby rendering them increasingly 
particular. Finally, the mandatory information duties failed to bring about 
greater harmonization, but rather a creeping differentiation between consumers 
by country. The multitude of European languages, for instance, posed certain 
a-priori demands. French consumers cannot be expected to understand a loan 
contract in Italian, so national legislators may impose mandatory language 
requirements to protect consumers.72 However, that requirement must be 
proportional to the consumer protection envisaged.73 Member states may thus 
force foreign creditors to translate their loan contracts.74
In short, what counted as normal in one member state could not 
in fairness be called that in another one. This led to different gauges for 
normal consumer behaviour depending on circumstances, society, culture, 
and product or service.75 At the same time Mr. and Mrs. Normal were 
increasingly differentiated following the recognition that their ability 
to choose responsibly depends on circumstances, and that circumstances 
often require extra consumer protection.76 Consumers facing doorstep 
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77 CoJ C-382/87, Prosecution v. R. Buet and sarl 
Educational Business Services; Stuyck and 
Straetmans, Financiële diensten, 31. Consideration 
13 CoJ C-382/87, Prosecution v. R. Buet and 
sarl Educational Business Services. See also 
the articles 58-64 ‘Wet Marktpraktijken en 
consumentenbescherming’ about consumer 
protection concerning transactions closed away 
from business premises.
78 Jacquemin, ‘Le formalisme’, 9-10 and 13-14, 
R. Steennot, ‘De impact van het privaat 
financieel recht op de wilsautonomie, de 
contractvrijheid en het consensualisme’, http://
www.law.ugent.be/fli/wps/pdf/WP2010-15.pdf, 
2010, 34.
79 Consideration 14 Guideline 97/7/ec of the 
European Parliament and the Council dated 
20 May 1997 about consumer protection 
concerning transactions involving distances 
between buyers and sellers, Gazette l 4 June 
1997, issue 144, 19-27.
80 Bar-Gill and Warren, ‘Making Credit Safer’, 
112; D. De Meza, B. Irlenbusch and D. Reyniers, 
Financial Capability: A Behavioural Economics 
Perspective, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
consumer-research/crpr69.pdf, 2008, 20; D. 
M. Grether, A. Schwartz and L.L. Wilde, ‘The 
Irrelevance of Information Overload: an Analysis 
of Search and Disclosure’, Southern California 
Law Review 58 (1985-1986) 277-303, ibidem 277-
278; Howells and Wilhelmsson, ‘ec Consumer 
Law’, 380-381.
81 Article 5 (3) Guideline 2005/29/ec. Critically 
on the determinability of vulnerable groups 
of consumers B.B. van Duivenvoorde, The 
Protection of Vulnerable Consumers under 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, 
Zeitschrift fur Europaisches Unternehmens- und 
Verbraucherrecht 2 (2013) 69-79.
82 Incardona and Poncibò, ‘The average consumer’, 
28-29.
83 rl 2008/48, L 133/66, consideration 9.
salesmen, for instance, have a weaker position, the more so if they need certain 
things and sellers know this.77 Somebody with a strong need for money 
will accept conditions sooner than a borrower without pressures of time or 
money.78 Distance to sellers means buyers need extra protection, because 
as a rule they cannot really see, let alone test, the goods or services.79
Consumers may also become more vulnerable as a consequence of 
how they handle information. They do not always act with perfect rationality, 
they may possess sufficient information, yet fail to act accordingly, for 
instance because they underestimate the likelihood of loss of income through 
illness or job loss.80 Finally a specific group of vulnerable consumers were 
recognized, i.e. people of whom it could be expected that their mental or 
physical handicap, their age, or their gullibility exposed them more than 
others to the risks of particular trade practices or products.81 As it turned 
out it proved not always easy to delineate this target group from the average 
consumer.82
The divergence in protection levels between member states made 
the eu realize that consumer protection should be raised to a higher level 
all around. A new guideline, adopted in 2008, retained the functional 
definition of credit transactions of the previous one.83 As a result the 
guideline’s coverage was extended to wage claims, the partial transfer of 
future income for a lower amount than will be paid, and to new products 
the rise of consumer society

Today consumer credit is accessible by mobile phone: a screenshot of an 
offer in July 2017. Photo: Johan Vannerom.
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84 Exempted from the extended guideline, be it 
not from financial supervision, are mortgage 
loans, hire and lease, transactions concerning 
overdrafts to be repaid within a month, 
credit cards, loans without interest or other 
costs, and loans to be repaid within three 
months at marginal cost. The Belgian financial 
supervision authority afm has specified 
those costs as 1 percent  of the loan sum per 
year and no more than 50 euros in total. The 
Dutch afm considers wage claims as offering 
a loan without license: verdict Court of Justice 
Arnhem 4 May 2012, ecli:rbarn:2012:bw7949; 
Court of Justice Rotterdam 20 April 2012, 
ecli:nl:rbrot:2012:bx3090; Court of Justice 
Breda 2 May 2012, ecli:nl:rbbre:2012:bw4484.
85 About Guideline 2008/48 V. Heutger, 
‘Consumentenkrediet’, in: A.S. Hartkamp, L. 
Keus, J. Kortmann and C. Sieburgh, Europese 
Invloeden op het Nederlandse Privaatrecht 
ii (Deventer 2014)121-139; M. De Muynck 
and J.M. van Poelgeest, ‘Het aanbieden van 
consumentenkrediet na Richtlijn 2008/48/eg: de 
Nederlandse en Belgische regelgeving aan elkaar 
getoetst’, Tijdschrift voor Consumentenrecht en 
handelspraktijken 2012-2, 55-63.
86 Articles 7:59 and 60.
87 For the Netherlands, for instance verdict 
Supreme Court hr 23 May 1997, nj 1998, 192 
(Rabo/Everaars); hr 26 June 1998, nj 1998, 660 
(Van de Klundert/Rabo); hr 11 July 2003, nj 2005, 
103 (Van Zuylen/Rabo); hr 5 June 2009, nj 2012, 
182 (De Treek/Dexia). Cf. Huls, Vergeef ons vaker 
24-25, 29-31.
88 Verdict Supreme Court hr 5 June 2009, nj 2012, 
182 (Den Treek/Dexia), r.o. 4.8.4.
like flash loans.84 However, the guideline makes no statements about 
mandatory licenses for lenders apart from the options mentioned in contract 
law, sanctions, and supervision.85 Conversely, member states may apply the 
guideline to subjects formally not covered by it. Thus the Netherlands and 
Belgium have brought free loans and those above 75,000 euros and below 
200 under the guideline.
The new guideline also testified to a changed conception of consumers. 
On the one hand lenders were put under fairly comprehensive mandatory 
rules of behaviour, including information duties both in publicity and prior 
to closing a transaction.86 Transactions also needed to be entered on standard 
forms disclosing the lender’s identity, and detailing the loan’s terms and 
conditions such as particular form, duration, and cost, and the borrower’s 
options to early repayment or cancellation. Lenders must thoroughly inform 
themselves about borrowers’ creditworthiness and ensure that they do not 
overburden themselves with debt; if transactions appear irresponsible, 
lenders should not enter into them. Those mandatory duties run more or 
less parallel to the particular fiduciary duties which the courts, prompted 
by cases about complex financial products, imposed on their providers from 
the 1990s onwards.87 However, when deciding relatively simple consumer 
credit transactions Dutch judges continued to hold consumers to their own 
responsibility, which should have kept them from overburdening themselves 
with debt.88
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89 See Vannerom, Consumentenbescherming, 111-113. 
As early as 2008, the Belgian financial market 
authority developed initiatives for training the 
financial abilities of consumers: L. Van Cauter, 
‘De fsma en de bescherming van de financiële 
consument’, Bank- en Financiewezen 75 (2011), 
267-272. cbfa, Verslag over het bevorderen van de 
financiële kennis in België, http://www.cbfa.be/
nl/consultations/lop/pdf/2008-10_promotion.
pdf [website no longer available], 2008, 30-39. 
For international initiatives see: eu, European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, 
‘Report on Financial Literacy and Education. 
Initiatives by Competent Authorities’(2011), 
https://eiopa.europa.eu/, 38p; the oecd, 
‘Recommendation of the Concil on Good 
Practices on Financial Education and Awareness 
Relating to Credit’(2009), www.oecd.org; oecd, 
‘Recommendation on Principles and Good 
Practices for Financial Education and Awareness’ 
(2005), http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-
education/35108560.pdf, 7p.; World Bank, ‘Good 
Practices for Financial Consumer Protection’.
90 V. Mak, ‘Een financieel geletterd consument 
telt voor twee, wat te doen met de anderen?’, 
Tijdschrift voor Consumentenrecht en 
Handelspraktijken 7:3 (2012) 96-98; Heutger, 
‘Consumentenkrediet’; J.J.A. Braspenning in 
a critical note under the verdict of the Court 
of Justice Arnhem-Leeuwarden 2 September 
2014, Tijdschrift voor Consumentenrecht en 
handelspraktijken 10:2 (2015) 82-89.
91 Cf. cbfa, Verslag over het bevorderen van de 
financiële kennis in België; cf. also De Meza, 
Irlenbusch and Reyniers, Financial Capability 
10-20 and A. Atkinson, S. McKay, E. Kempson 
and S. Collard, Levels of Financial Capability in the 
uk: Results of a Baseline Survey, http://www.fsa.
gov.uk/pubs/consumer-research/crpr47.pdf  
(2006).
92 G. Becker, ‘The Economic Way of Looking at 
Behavior’, in: F. Parisi and C.K. Roweley, ed., 
The Origins of Law and Economics. Essays by the 
Founding Fathers (Cheltenham 2005) 135-155, 
ibidem 141.
93 Van Dyck, Geharmoniseerde prospectusplicht, 93.
From Paradigm to Paradox
Meanwhile national and international authorities woke up to the fact 
that mandatory information duties for financial service providers are not 
enough,89 because a large percentage of consumers do not understand 
what the information provided.90 If consumers are to assume their own 
responsibility, they need to become, in modern parlance, ‘financially literate’, 
which they seldom are. Consequently, the Information Paradigm leads to 
an Information Paradox: to be free to choose, consumers must be forced to 
absorb information that barely interests them. Consumers take little active 
interest in their financial affairs. A 2007 survey in Belgium showed that only 
35 percent of those questioned had looked for information from two or more 
banks.91 Apparently consumers consider the bother of getting all information 
to outweigh its use.92 This highlights another consequence of the Information 
Paradigm mentioned above. Accepting that informing consumers is the best 
way of protecting them also means accepting that consumers are liable for 
the consequences of their choices.93 Regulatory authorities are reluctant to 
accept that consequence. As a result initiatives for the financial education 
of consumers retain a certain degree of paternalism which partly defeats 
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94 Van Dyck also pleads for alternative forms of 
consumer protection: T. Van Dyck, ‘Antwoord 
op de open consultatie van de cbfa over het 
Verslag over het bevorderen van de financiële 
kennis in België’, http://www.tomvandyck.com/
Consultatiedocument%20CBFA%20%20-%20
Financial%20Education%20%283%20January%20
2009%29.pdf [website no longer available], 
2008, 5. See also R.A. Epstein, ‘The Neoclassical 
Economics of Consumer Contracts’, in: O. Bar-Gill 
and R.A. Epstein, Consumer Contracts: Behavioral 
Economics vs. Neoclassical Economics. An exchange 
between Oren Bar-Gill and Richard A. Epstein, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982527 (New York 
2007) 1-19, ibidem 6-7.
the purpose of campaigns to improve consumer protection. Therefore the 
search for alternative forms of consumer protection must be continued, if 
only because it is a fact that people find it difficult to improve their financial 
skills.94
Conclusion
Our comparison of changing attitudes towards credit and consumption in the 
Low Countries showed, first of all, a negative view, based on social prejudice, 
of consumer credit as a vice mainly affecting people on low incomes. At the 
same time the two countries developed, from a highly similar legal basis, 
different policies to tackle perceived ills. To combat usury, Belgium curtailed 
the Code de Civil and the Code de Commerce’s hallowed freedom of contracting. 
However, Dutch lawyers baulked at that and preferred to trust the market’s 
ability to balance interests and eradicate injustices, until the Geldschieterswet 
in 1932 introduced a combination of mandatory standard contracts and 
government supervision of the sector. This difference between the two 
countries became more marked over time, Belgium showing a mistrust of 
the market and a tendency to intervene, the Netherlands relying more on 
the market and on soft law and the consumer’s own responsibility to prevent 
mishaps.
During the 1960s general attitudes towards consumer credit changed 
in both countries. As rising disposable incomes boosted credit use, credit came 
to be seen as a normal part of modern life and modern consumption patterns 
for everyone. New legislation eliminated previous prejudices and rendered 
all consumers classless, equal before the law, a momentous shift in attitudes 
which in our view marks the general acceptance of modern consumption 
patterns in all their ramifications, i.e. the advent of the consumer society. 
However, that equality before the law did not last. European consumer 
protection legislation adopted the Information Paradigm, the principle that 
properly informed consumers make rational choices, in which case they are 
responsible for what they choose. Hardly had Mr. and Mrs. Normal been 
created or consumers were being subdivided into more and more categories 
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deserving of protection because of their recognized inability to absorb 
sufficient information at the right moment. At the same time the increasing 
complexity of financial products hollowed out the mandatory information 
duties to the point of becoming useless, resulting in an information paradox: 
consumers can only be considered responsible if they could be brought to 
stomach a mass of indigestible information. Both governments have put 
their hopes on financial education to bring consumers to do just that, but the 
Information Paradigm has fragmented the mass of consumers, once all equal 
before the law, into numerous special interest groups deserving attention for 
one reason or another.
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